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I'll try to explain their argument under the assumption handles were convincingly fake, e.g. there wasn't a heuristic to tell real and fake handles apart.

The underlying protocol (U2F or CTAP) will send all received handles to the separate hardware authenticator. Some of these may be real, some may be fake. Some may have been created by other keys.

There is a process to convert correct handles to a correct private key inside the hardware. This _should_ have some sort of integrity to prevent taking incorrect handles and creating garbage private keys as well - those will fail, but the user experience will be sub-par and there are always cryptographic concerns about processing attacker-chosen data.

So when I make the gesture to authenticate, the valid private key which came from a correct handle is used to sign a response message to the authentication request. All the fake handles and those created by other keys would be ignored.

So if the handles are convincingly fake, the web site would be the only one which would know which were real or fake (so that it can still offer proper user self-service management). An individual piece of hardware would know which were real handles that it created. An attacker wouldn't know if they were all fake.



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