So, the problem is that when you settle you give away your right to get your money back if the patent it later invalidated. This makes for a perverse incentive.
I wonder if there is some way of credibly signalling that you won't settle, even if you don't have the money for a lawsuit. Can you give away your right to settle?
IE, could we set up some organisation whereby you give them the right to veto any settlement you make to a patent troll? And that organisation then insists on a clause whereby any settlement can be undone if the patent is later invalidated.
Of course, the troll would probably insist on getting more money, but even if they do, if the patent is invalid you stand a good chance of get it back.
There's probably a flaw in the above scheme somewhere, but surely there's some way of doing this...
I wonder if there is some way of credibly signalling that you won't settle, even if you don't have the money for a lawsuit. Can you give away your right to settle? IE, could we set up some organisation whereby you give them the right to veto any settlement you make to a patent troll? And that organisation then insists on a clause whereby any settlement can be undone if the patent is later invalidated.
Of course, the troll would probably insist on getting more money, but even if they do, if the patent is invalid you stand a good chance of get it back.
There's probably a flaw in the above scheme somewhere, but surely there's some way of doing this...